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Oregon v. Elstad: The Supreme Court Puts
the Cat Back in the Bag
I. Introduction
In Oregon v. Elstad, the seminal Miranda v. Arizona2 deci-
sion was once again the subject of debate in the Supreme Court.8
In Miranda, the Court found that inherent compulsion is pre-
sent in all custodial interrogation, and the Court held that such
compulsion must be counteracted with procedural safeguards to
protect a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination.4 A confession not preceded by such safeguards is
presumed to be coerced and, therefore, must be excluded from
evidence.5
1. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Since Miranda was decided in 1966 it has been the subject of continuous judicial
interpretation and scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1984) (reaffirming that Miranda warnings are prophylactic standards); Fletcher v. Weir,
455 U.S. 603 (1982) (post-arrest silence was used to impeach the credibility of defend-
ant's exculpatory statements); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (post-Miranda
request for a probation officer does not invoke constitutional rights); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978) (voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda can be used to
impeach defendant's testimony at trial); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976)
(Miranda warnings are unnecessary in a noncustodial, coercive situation); United States
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (Miranda warnings need not be given to a grand jury
witness); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements taken in violation of Miranda
used to impeach defendant on cross-examination); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974) (Miranda warnings are only prophylactic standards to protect the privilege); Har-
ris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements taken in violation of Miranda can be
used to impeach defendant's testimony); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (interpret-
ing the meaning of "in custody"); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (also inter-
preting the meaning of "in custody").
For criticism of the Miranda decision, see generally Caplan, Miranda Revisited, 93
YALE L.J. 1375 (1984); Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona - The Law Today, 78 MiL. L. REV.
107 (1978); Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Inter-
rogation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police
Capacity to Comply, 1968 DuKE L.J. 425; Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 645 (1967).
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 478-79.
5. Id. at 444 ("[Tihe prosecution may not use statements... stemming from custo-
dial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe-
guards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.").
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In Oregon v. Elstad, the Court had to determine whether
the Miranda presumption of coercion extended to a situation
where a defendant made two voluntary confessions, one in the
absence of Miranda warnings, and the other after Miranda
warnings were administered and waived by the defendant. The
Court held that Miranda did not reach this situation' and that
the second confession was admissible as evidence.'
Part II of this Note reviews the development of the exclu-
sionary rule, the tainted fruit doctrine, and the growing distinc-
tion between Miranda's presumption of coercion and the actual
voluntariness of a confession. Part III presents the facts, proce-
dural history, and the opinion of the Supreme Court in Oregon
v. Elstad. Part IV analyzes the Court's decision, its impact on
prior doctrine and its potential for future application. Part V
concludes that the Court was correct in denying the exclusion of
the confession because the confession had not been taken in vio-
lation of the Constitution or of Miranda, and that its suppres-
sion would not serve the principles of the exclusionary rule.
II. Background
A. Pre-Miranda Treatment of Confessions
The earliest cases concerning exclusions of coerced confes-
sions appeared in the 1930's and 1940's.8 The fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was not applied expressly to
state criminal prosecutions until 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan,9 and
the privilege did not extend to police interrogations until Mi-
randa v. Arizona.10 In both state and federal cases, coerced con-
fessions were traditionally dealt with under a due process volun-
6. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292-93 ("Where an unwarned statement is preserved for use
in situations that fall outside the sweep of the Miranda presumption, 'the primary crite-
rion of admissibility [remains] the "old" due process voluntariness test.' ") (quoting
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 877 (1981)).
7. Id. at 1298. The Court remanded the case to determine if the second confession
was voluntary based on a due process test.
8. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941) (per curiam); White v. Texas, 310 U.S.
530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940) (per curiam); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[Vol. 6:495
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tariness test."
Initially, the Court was concerned with physical coercion
and excluded evidence derived through such methods on due
process grounds." The reasons for excluding testimony com-
pelled by police brutality were twofold. First, inclusion of such
testimony was not consistent with society's sense of justice and,
second, physical coercion tended to make such evidence untrust-
worthy." However, attention soon focused on psychological coer-
cion rather than physical brutality."' The Court was concerned
with the issue of whether the police officer's behavior overbore
the defendant's will to resist.' 5 The fact that the officer's con-
duct produced truthful statements was irrelevant.'6 The Court
11. See generally, Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interro-
gation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449 (1964); Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HAJv.
L. REv. 935 (1966).
12. But see cases cited supra note 8.
13. White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 531-33 (1940) (confession coerced by physical bru-
tality); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (involving brutal beating to extract
confession).
14. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (a confession extracted through
skillful and suggestive questioning, thrusts and promises, by a psychiatrist is inconsistent
with due process); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (it is a violation of due process to
hold a defendant in solitary confinement with no place to sit or sleep except the floor,
and interrogate him by relays of police officers, usually until long past midnight, for
nearly one week); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (a confession is compulsory if
it is extracted as a result of repeated inquisitions, without friends or counselors present,
and under circumstances calculated to inspire terror). See generally Driver, Confessions
and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HArv. L. REv. 42 (1968) (analyzing effects of
coercion on individual suspects).
15. Driver, supra note 14, at 43.
16. The Court was concerned only with striking confessions which were induced by
police misconduct involving artifice and deception. In Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963), the defendant was charged with unlawful possession and sale of marijuana. The
police falsely told defendant that she would lose public assistance and custody of her
children unless she cooperated, in which case they would recommend leniency. As a re-
sult of this coercion, the defendant confessed. The confession was held inadmissable re-
gardless of its trustworthiness. In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), the defend-
ant was charged with murder and then questioned by a team of three officers for six
hours. When this did not elicit a confession, the police chief falsely told defendant he
was going to take the defendant's wife, who was suffering from a debilitating disease,
into custody. An hour later the police chief made a second threat concerning defendant's
wife. A confession followed. The Court stated that it was irrelevant whether or not the
confession was likely to be true. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), a police
officer tricked the accused, who was a childhood friend, into believing his job was in
jeopardy. After eight hours of continuous questioning, the fatigued defendant confessed
to murdering a man who stole money from him. The trustworthiness of the confession
3
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identified psychologically coercive measures that precluded the
voluntariness of confessions, such as repeated interrogations,17
isolated detention, 8 prolonged periods of interrogation,19 state-
ments made when the accused was physically injured,"' and the
absence of warnings of one's constitutional rights.2
The Court's solution to the problem of psychological coer-
cion was to exclude confessions where both the physical sur-
roundings of interrogation and the manner of interrogation in-
fluenced suspects. The Court next addressed a subtler form of
coercion, such as denying a particular suspect the knowledge
that he has the right to remain silent and the right to consult
counsel. In Miranda v. Arizona,22 the Court held that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to
an accused who is subjected to police interrogation.2 s
B. The Miranda Court's Treatment of Confessions
The Miranda Court considered four cases which had com-
mon salient features: each of the defendants was subjected to
custodial interrogation, deprived of full warnings, held incom-
was not a consideration.
17. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966) ("The fact that each individ-
ual interrogation session was of relatively short duration does not mitigate the substan-
tial coercive effect created by repeated interrogation in these surroundings over 16
days.").
18. Id. at 745-46.
19. Evidence of extended interrogation often results in a finding of involuntariness.
See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
20. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the defendant was questioned in a
hospital bed while in a weakened state; he was encumbered with tubes after being shot
during a narcotics raid. Defendant's serious condition did not prevent a detective from
interrogating him. "He was evidently confused and unable to think clearly about either
the events of that afternoon or the circumstances of his interrogation .... He was... 'at
the complete mercy' [of the detective]." Id. at 398-99.
21. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1963) (failure to effectively advise
a defendant of his rights adds weight to the circumstances which make a confession
involuntary).
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 478-79. See also Friendly, The Fifth Amendment To-
morrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968). For a history
of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, see L. LEVY, ORIGINS OP THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (1968). See also E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); L.
MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959) (policy justifications for the
adoption, extension, and contraction of the privilege).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/5
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municado, and questioned by police in a manner that elicited
incriminating statements. 4 The Court found that all of the de-
fendants had been held in a police dominated atmosphere and
concluded that such an environment is inherently coercive.25
The Miranda Court set out four "fundamental" warnings
which were required in order to counteract the inherent coer-
civeness of the custodial interrogation process: the right to re-
main silent, any statement may be used against an individual as
evidence, an accused has the right to counsel present during
questioning, and if the accused cannot afford an attorney one
will be provided.2 6 In addition, the Court held that Miranda
warnings must be administered prior to "custodial interroga-
tion 12 so that the psychological pressures of custodial interroga-
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
25. Id. at 457.
26. The warnings were summarized by the Court as follows: "[pirior to any ques-
tioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any state-
ment he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
27. Custodial interrogation was defined by the Court as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. The following cases
helped define custodial interrogation: Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969) (suspect
cannot be taken into custody for a custodial interrogation on less than probable cause);
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (further defined custodial interrogation so as to
include the compulsion which arises when police officers confront a defendant in his own
bedroom rather than limiting the rule to the ostensibly coercive atmosphere of the sta-
tionhouse). The definition of custodial interrogation was broadened in Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), where an agent of the Internal Revenue Service questioned a
penitentiary inmate concerning a criminal tax investigation while the inmate was serving
time on an unrelated charge. The Court held that for a statement to be admissible when
taken from a person who is interrogated while in custody, even if the accused is in cus-
tody for the purpose of the investigation of an unrelated offense, Miranda warnings must
be given. Id. at 3-5.
In People v. Shivers, 21 N.Y.2d 118, 233 N.E.2d 836, 286 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1967), the
definition of custodial interrogation was found flexible enough to include the deprivation
of freedom of action that can occur when a suspect is questioned at gunpoint. Even in
this nontraditional situation, if testimony was obtained absent warnings, it was inadmis-
sible regardless of whether the statements were inculpatory or exculpatory. See Miranda,
384 U.S. at 477.
At one time it appeared that the Miranda decision would be extended to numerous
other situations, but in recent years the Court has declined to so extend Miranda. In
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), the Court held that a taxpayer is not in
custody if he is interviewed during an Internal Revenue Service criminal investigation
where the interview begins in the taxpayer's home and continues at his office.
Another narrow reading of Miranda was given in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
1986]
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tion do not thwart the accused's right to silence.28
C. Post-Miranda Treatment of Confessions
Subsequent to the Miranda decision, the Court delineated
the boundaries of Miranda. Guidelines were laid down to deter-
mine exactly what constitutes custodial interrogation, 29 how the
accused can invoke his constitutional rights, 30 and what actions
constitute waiver of such rights.31
The Miranda decision mandated broad rules concerning the
(1977), where a parolee was asked to come to the police station in connection with a
burglary. When he arrived he was expressly told that he was not under arrest, but a
police officer falsely informed him that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the
crime. The fingerprint story induced a confession which was held admissible because the
defendant came voluntarily to the police station; he was not deprived of his freedom of
action and therefore he was not under custodial interrogation.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), a defendant who was suspected of
murder was arrested, given his Miranda warnings, and after invoking his right to remain
silent he was placed in a caged wagon with officers who had been instructed not to con-
verse with the defendant. The officers initiated a conversation among themselves but
within earshot of the defendant. They indicated how tragic it would be if a small child
from the area were to find the murder weapon. This discussion played on the sympathies
of the defendant who immediately told the officers of the whereabouts of the shotgun.
The Court held that the statements and the shotgun were admissible because the de-
fendant had not been interrogated - there must be questioning or the functional
equivalent of questioning for an interrogation to take place. The Court found that there
is subtle compulsion in all interrogation so it designed a test to determine when the
interrogation evokes a measure of compulsion above that inherent in custody itself: for
an interrogation to occur it must be established that a police officer should have known
that his conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 302-03.
See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
See also Note, The Meaning of "Interrogation" Under Miranda v. Arizona: Rhode
Island v. Innis, 12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 725 (1981); Note, The United States Supreme
Court Redefines Interrogation for Miranda Purposes - Rhode Island v. Innis, 3 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 409 (1981).
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
29. See supra note 27.
30. The Miranda Court said that for an accused to invoke his constitutional rights
after he has been given his warnings, he need only indicate:
in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to re-
main silent, [and consequently] the interrogation must cease. At this point he has
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise .... If the individual states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/5
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invocation and waiver of constitutional rights. These two areas
have subsequently been treated as separate considerations war-
ranting different degrees of scrutiny.2
1. Invoking Constitutional Rights
The question of whether a defendant has invoked his con-
stitutional rights is more easily determined than the question of
whether a defendant has waived his constitutional rights. The
Miranda Court stated that a defendant invokes his right to re-
main silent if he "indicates in any manner" that he does not
wish to be interrogated. 3 This statement has been interpreted
to mean that the right to remain silent is immediately invoked
upon an officer's rendering of an effective warning - a suspect
need not affirmatively exercise his right to remain silent.3 4
Unlike the right to remain silent, a suspect's fifth amend-
ment right to counsel3 5 is not automatically invoked. This dis-
tinction stems from Miranda where the Court said that a sus-
pect's "pre-interrogation request for a lawyer .. .affirmatively
secures his right to have one."'36 The courts have interpreted this
as requiring a suspect to exercise affirmatively his right to coun-
sel in order to invoke the privilege.3 Once a suspect expresses
32. See generally Lederer, supra note 3. See infra notes 33-54 and accompanying
text.
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added).
34. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (a defendant invoked his constitu-
tional right to remain silent when he declined to discuss the robbery for which he was
arrested).
Courts have had difficulty in determining whether a suspect has, in fact, completely
or merely partially exercised his privilege to remain silent. See United States v.
Marchildon, 519 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1975) (defendant's negative response to police
request to inform meant only that the suspect would not talk about his sources of sup-
ply, not that he wished to remain silent). See also Lederer, supra note 3, at 144.
35. See Lederer, supra note 3, at 144. Miranda raised both fifth and sixth amend-
ment issues. The Court reasoned that the sixth amendment right to counsel was essential
to a realistic exercise of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 469-71.
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
37. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (the defendant had not in-
voked his constitutional right when he expressly refused to sign a waiver card but said he
would speak to the police officers; he neither expressed a desire to consult counsel nor
made an attempt to terminate the interrogation); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)
(defendant's request for his probation officer is not a per se invocation of his sixth
amendment right to counsel under Miranda because a probation officer does not serve
7
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:495
his desire to consult counsel, interrogation should terminate un-
til a lawyer is present or the suspect makes a valid waiver.38
2. Waiving Constitutional Rights
Since Miranda, the courts have struggled to determine what
constitutes a valid waiver of one's fifth amendment rights.39 A
valid Miranda waiver presupposes that the suspect has been
given the requisite procedural safeguards and that he under-
stands his rights; indeed, "a heavy burden rests on the govern-
ment to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to retained or appointed counsel."' 0 Miranda's require-
ments concerning waiver were inexplicit.'1 Thus, in Michigan v.
the same function in an adversarial system as an attorney); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981) (defendant invoked his constitutional right to consult counsel when he said he
wanted to speak to an attorney).
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
39. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 (1979) (defendant's waiver of rights was
valid under a totality of the circumstances approach); Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04 (the
Court applied the "scrupulously honored" standard for reinterrogation following an as-
sertion of the right to remain silent); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (the court held that once a defendant retains an
attorney or has counsel appointed, no statement made by him in the absence of that
attorney is admissible unless there was notification and a reasonable opportunity for
counsel to be present); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1973) (ex-
pressing concern that the rule requiring presence of counsel would be applied only to
those who actually have lawyers).
See generally Lederer, supra note 3, at 144-48. Note, Reinforcing Mi-
randa - Restricting Interrogation After a Request for Counsel, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV.
593 (1982); Note, Balancing the Right to Interrogate Against the Right to Counsel: Ed-
wards v. Arizona, 17 GONz. L. REV. 697 (1982); Note, Fifth Amendment, Confessions,
Self-Incrimination - Does a Request for Counsel Prohibit a Subsequent Waiver of
Miranda Prior to the Presence of Counsel?, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1321 (1977); Note, Waiver
of Rights in Police Interrogations: Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 413
(1969).
40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. For criticism of this declaration, see Jacobs, Miranda:
The Right to Silence, 11 TIM 69 (1975). This commentator discusses some inconsisten-
cies in the Miranda opinion's requirement that a defendant waive his rights and waive
them knowingly. This commentator further explains why Miranda's safeguards fail to
dissolve the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation - the pressure to waive one's
right to remain silent is no less compelling than the pressure to confess.
41. The Miranda Court stated that proving an accused had waived his constitu-
tional rights requires the government to meet a "high standard of proof." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 475.
[An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/5
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Mosley 42 the Court corrected this vagueness. In Mosley the de-
fendant declined to answer any questions involving the robberies
for which he was arrested.43 The police officer who had given
Mosley his Miranda warnings properly ceased questioning him
upon the invocation of his right to remain silent. However, less
than three hours later, another detective re-administered the
warnings to Mosley and questioned him about an unrelated
murder.44 During this second interrogation, Mosley made an in-
criminating statement and he was subsequently convicted of
murder.45
The Mosley Court reiterated the Miranda principle that a
suspect can counteract "the coercive pressures of the custodial
setting" 46 if he is aware that he has the right to cut off question-
ing. The knowledge of one's right to remain silent would allow
the suspect to flex some control over the content, length, and
depth of the interrogation. In applying this principle, the Mos-
ley Court noted that a confession taken during a second interro-
gation does not violate Miranda if the following factors are pre-
sent: all questioning has ceased after the first interrogation, a
significant period of time has passed with fresh warnings given,
and the interrogation has been commenced on a different matter
by a different interrogator.47
waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in
fact eventually obtained .... Moreover, where in-custody interrogation is involved,
there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual
answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his
right to remain silent when interrogated.
Id. at 475-76.
42. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
43. Id. at 97.
44. Id. at 97-98.
45. Id. at 98-99.
46. Id. at 104.
47. Id. at 106. Justice White, a dissenter in Miranda, concurred in the result of
Mosley. The Justice noted his belief that the Court was moving toward the test of volun-
tariness as to whether a properly informed defendant waived his right of silence. Accord-
ing to the Justice, the Court was looking beyond the presumption of compulsion laid
down in Miranda to whether actual compulsion had been dissipated. This was a move-
ment away from Miranda and a step toward the due process voluntariness inquiry Mi-
randa sought to extinguish in determining when a defendant in custodial interrogation is
acting voluntarily. Id. at 108 (White, J., concurring).
The Miranda Court stated that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed
19861
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In North Carolina v. Butler,"" the Court created a case-by-
case test to determine whether a defendant has waived his con-
stitutional rights. The Court acknowledged that Miranda firmly
stated that silence is insufficient to constitute a waiver; however,
the Butler majority held that silence, accompanied by an under-
standing of one's rights and a course of conduct indicating
waiver, may indeed constitute a waiver.4" The Butler Court held
that an express statement of waiver is not essential: "the ques-
tion of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused.' 50
A valid waiver of the right to consult counsel was defined in
Edwards v. Arizona51 where Edwards had asserted both his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel when police officers at-
tempted to interrogate him. The next morning, however, the po-
lice officers who initially interrogated Edwards returned to speak
with him. The officers were not accompanied by counsel, and
Edwards, over his objection, was told he had to speak with the
officers. It was during this second interrogation that Edwards
implicated himself in the crime.52
The Court held that Edwards' admissions should be ex-
cluded because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights."3 Once an accused invokes his right to counsel, the ac-
cused must be the one to initiate further communications with
the police to waive his constitutional rights - the fact that a
suspect merely responds to further police questioning does not
constitute a waiver; to waive his constitutional rights, Edwards
to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from
the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
48. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
49. Id. at 373. Butler was advised of his Miranda rights. He read a waiver of rights
form which he refused to sign; however, he said he fully understood his rights and that
he would speak to the officers. He never asked for counsel nor tried to terminate the
interrogation.
50. Id. at 374-75 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
51. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
52. The Court, in determining the validity of a waiver, focused on whether the
waiver was made knowingly and intelligently rather than on whether the statement was
voluntary. Id. at 482-84.
53. Id. at 482.
[Vol. 6:495
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had to be the one to initiate further communications with the
police. 4
54. Id. at 484-85. In accordance with Miranda, the Edwards Court replaced the vol-
untariness inquiry with a presumption that a defendant does not relinquish the right he
has invoked merely by answering additional questions put to him by the interrogator. Id.
In so doing, the Court refused to displace Miranda's presumption of compulsion in the
context of waiver of constitutional rights. However, a different result was reached where
statements taken in violation of Miranda could discredit a defendant's testimony if he
chose to take the stand. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court refused to
extend Miranda to an area clearly intended to come within Miranda's grasp. See gener-
ally Kent, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder?, 38 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 357 (1971).
The Harris case and its progeny have distinguished Miranda's presumption of com-
pulsion from the actual compulsion that may arise during custodial interrogation. Ac-
cord, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (prior inconsistent statements taken in vio-
lation of Miranda were admissible for purposes of impeachment but only if such
statements were voluntary so as not to deny due process of law).
In Harris, the Court held that Miranda did not bar the use of prior inconsistent
statements taken in the absence of full warnings to impeach testimony at trial. The Har-
ris Court had three major justifications for its holding. First, the Court said that the
issue of whether unwarned statements can be used for purposes beyond the prosecution's
case in chief was not necessary to Miranda's holding, so Miranda was not controlling on
this issue in Harris. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. Second, the benefits gained from discredit-
ing a defendant's perjurious testimony are valuable while the cost of using an unwarned
statement is only the "speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be
encouraged thereby." Id. at 225. Third, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is
served when the presumptively coercive statement is barred from the prosecution's case
in chief. Id. at 225. The Court was, in actuality, justifying its holding on an exclusionary
rule that solely serves the purpose of deterring police misconduct. See generally Pe-
lander, Michigan v. Tucker: Warning About Miranda, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 188 (1975). But
more importantly for the discussion here, the Harris Court began distinguishing between
actual coercion and the inherent compulsion of Miranda.
Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of an ac-
cused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It does
not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the
prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that the
trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.
Id. at 224.
It should be noted that at least three states have disagreed with the Harris decision
and have refused to apply it. See, State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.
3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
Harris was reaffirmed in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), where the Court al-
lowed inculpatory statements to be used to discredit the defendant even though they
were presumptively coercive by Miranda standards and may have been actually coercive
by due process standards. In Hass, the defendant was arrested and given his Miranda
warnings. While being transported to the station, the defendant said he wanted to tele-
phone a lawyer. A police officer told him that he could contact a lawyer as soon as they
reached the station, but by that time the defendant had already made an incriminating
11
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3. Constitutional Mandate or Judicial Construct
After Miranda, a new issue emerged for judicial debate:
whether the procedural safeguards set out in Miranda were con-
stitutionally mandated or judicially created. The Miranda Court
held that they were constitutionally mandated, but subsequent
decisions described them as "judicially created rules of
evidence. '""
In New York v. Quarles,56 the Court made an actual excep-
tion to Miranda.57 The Court held that where public safety is
concerned, a breach of Miranda is not fatal to the admissibility
of a confession.5 8 The Court would not have made an exception
to a constitutional requirement; therefore, such a decision pre-
supposes that the Court was making an exception to a judicial
construct. In the years prior to Quarles, the Court redefined the
aim of Miranda, the justifications for the fifth amendment ex-
clusionary rule, and how the exclusionary rule is to be applied.
After summarizing its holding that procedural safeguards
must be employed to protect the rights of an individual who is
interrogated while in custody, the Miranda Court stated that
"[t]he whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates
statement. The Court held that the statement was admissible, but solely for impeach-
ment purposes. Id. at 722.
The Court, however, placed some limitations on the Harris-Hass trend of analysis.
In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court said that presumptively coercive
statements - those taken in violation of Miranda - could not be used for impeach-
ment purposes if they were also involuntary by due process standards. The defendant's
statements had to be "the product of a rational intellect and a free will." Id. at 398
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963)).
The Mincey Court made a distinction between statements that are presumptively
coercive and those which actually violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 397-98. While the waiver cases did not totally revive the use of due
process standards in determining whether an accused waived his constitutional rights,
the Court uses such standards in the context of impeachment.
55. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974) (the procedural safeguards of
Miranda are only "prophylactic standards," so, if a police officer, in good faith, fails to
comply with the warnings, his actions may run short of violating a suspect's constitu-
tional rights); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (in the fourth amend-
ment context the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter fu-
ture police misconduct).
56. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
57. Id. at 658 ("In recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case,
we acknowledge that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that rule.").
58. Id.
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that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individ-
ual when confronted with the power of government when it pro-
vided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself."5 However, in Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 0 the Court declared that the warnings are "pro-
phylactic rules" which were judicially created rather than consti-
tutionally prescribed.'
The defendant in Tucker was arrested and questioned in
connection with a rape.62 The interrogation took place prior to
the Miranda decision; however, because the trial was subsequent
to Miranda, Miranda was held applicable.13 Tucker was interro-
gated in accordance with Escobedo v. Illinois:64 he was warned
of all of his rights, except that he was not advised that if he
could not afford counsel one would be appointed free of charge. 5
The defendant then told the police that he had been with his
friend, Henderson, on the night of the crime.66 When police
questioned Henderson, his statements not only discredited
Tucker's alibi, but they also incriminated Tucker.6 7
At a pre-trial hearing, Tucker sought to suppress any testi-
mony Henderson might give at trial because Tucker revealed
Henderson's identity in the absence of full Miranda warnings.6
The Court stated that the goal of the exclusionary rule is to de-
ter police misconduct and because the police misconduct here
was an "inadvertent disregard" 9 for procedural safeguards, not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution, exclusion would
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added).
60. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
61. Id. at 439.
62. Id. at 436.
63. Id. at 436-37.
64. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the defendant was not warned of his constitu-
tional right to remain silent and was denied his request to consult with his attorney. Id.
at 481. The Court recognized that when an officer uses his power to extract answers he
will often go beyond the lawful bounds of such power to extract what he feels is the
correct answer, a confession of guilt. Therefore, the Escobedo court placed some limita-
tions on police conduct. Id. at 490-91.
65. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 438.
66. Id. at 436.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 437.
69. Id. at 445.
1986]
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
not serve a "valid and useful purpose. '70 The Court held that
Henderson's testimony would be admissible because the actions
of the police did not infringe on Tucker's privilege against self-
incrimination. 71
In New York v. Quarles, the Court did not reinterpret Mi-
randa72 nor claim that Miranda's requirements did not reach
the particular situation.73 Instead, the Court created an excep-
tion to the Miranda holding.74 The Court held that the concern
for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal
language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.7
In Quarles, two police officers were on patrol when a woman
informed them that she had just been raped. She then described
her assailant 78 and told the officers that the man had run into a
nearby supermarket. 77 When the police officers entered the store
they noticed a man fitting the description given by the victim.
The suspect, Quarles, upon seeing the officers, ran into the back
of the store where he was stopped and frisked.78 When one of
the officers discovered that Quarles was wearing an empty shoul-
der holster, he quickly hand-cuffed him and, in the absence of
70. Id. at 446.
71. Id. at 445-46. For criticism of the Tucker Court's characterization of the Mi-
randa warnings as no more than "prophylactic rules" judicially created to safeguard the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see, Stone, The Miranda Doctrine
in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 123-25; and Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Inter-
rogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 38-41 (1978).
72. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369
(1979); and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), are good examples of the new inter-
pretations the Court was applying to Miranda. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying
text.
73. See supra note 27. See also, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (a request
for a probation officer is not a per se invocation of a defendant's rights when the defend-
ant has already knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights); Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (the Court refused to extend Miranda to noncustodial
circumstances); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (refusal to extend Miranda
requirements to interviews with probation officers).
74. See Note, New York v. Quarles: Safety First?, 5 PACE L. REV. 751, 766 (1985)
(illustrating the conflict, created by the Court's exception, between the fifth amend-
ment's protection against self-incrimination and a concern for public safety).
75. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
76. Id. at 651. The assailant was described as a black male, wearing a dark jacket
with the words "Big Ben" printed in yellow letters on the back. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 652.
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Miranda warnings, asked him where the gun was.79 With a nod
the defendant indicated that he had tossed the gun into some
empty cartons. After the gun was retrieved the defendant was
given his Miranda warnings, whereupon he said he would answer
the officers' questions. It was in the course of this custodial in-
terrogation that the defendant revealed that he owned the gun
which had been found in the supermarket and subsequently ad-
mitted into evidence.80
In reaching this public safety exception to Miranda, the
Court reaffirmed the Tucker pronouncement that the Miranda
warnings were no more than prophylactic rules which were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution;81 moreover,
where public safety and the rules of Miranda clash, the Court
held that public safety takes precedence.8 2
D. An Evolving Exclusionary Rule
1. As Applied to the Fourth Amendment
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine that
secures the constitutional rights of citizens by excluding uncon-
stitutionally seized evidence from a criminal proceeding.8 3 The
exclusionary rule first appeared in the fourth amendment con-
text in Weeks v. United States 4 where the federal government,
in a criminal trial, was barred from using evidence that had been
seized in violation of the fourth amendment.8 5 Forty-seven years
later, in Mapp v. Ohio,"' the exclusionary rule was applied to the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 654. ("The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are 'not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected . . . .' Requiring Miranda warnings
before custodial interrogation provides 'practical reinforcement' for the Fifth Amend-
ment right.") (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
82. Id. at 656.
83. See Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional
Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143 (1978) (tracing the history and the ratio-
nales of the exclusionary rule and seeking to determine whether the rule requires exclu-
sion in all instances of police violations of constitutional rights).
84. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
85. Id. at 398.
86. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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states through the fourteenth amendment."
The principles which have been cited as the rationale for
the exclusionary rule are numerous.8s The principle rationale for
the invocation of the rule is to preserve the constitutional rights
of individuals."9 Moreover, in United States v. Calandra,9" the
Court noted that the primary justification for the exclusionary
rule was the deterrent effect that the exclusionary rule has on
impermissible police conduct.9
87. First, it was thought to be unfair to convict an individual on evidence illegally
taken from him. See generally White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" De-
bate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1283-84 (1983).
Second, admitting tainted evidence is an additional infringement of a defendant's
privacy. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920)
(records the government obtained during an illegal search of corporate offices were held
inadmissible).
Third, the government should not benefit from the misconduct of its own officials.
Id. at 392.
Finally, the federal courts would become a part of the illegality by accepting unlaw-
fully seized evidence and thereby continuing the unjust use. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (using unlawfully seized evi-
dence in court would virtually condone the illegality of the seizure).
For a brief discussion of the development of the exclusionary rule, see Kamisar,
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than
an "Empirical Proposition'?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565, 590-645 (1983); and Mertens &
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the
Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 367-82 (1981).
88. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But was it
a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (1984) (these authors present an in depth analysis
of the exclusionary rule and the Court's recent good faith exception).
89. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392.
90. 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
91. Id. at 347-48. The Calandra Court held that a witness cannot refuse to answer
questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure. The Court reached this conclusion after it determined that suppres-
sion of unlawful evidence is only one method of effectuating the fourth amendment, and
the Court does not have to adopt every method that might deter police misconduct. Id.
See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (the "prime purpose of the
[exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct.' ").
Moreover, the Court distinguishes the fourth amendment exclusionary rule from the "di-
rect command" of exclusion in the fifth amendment. Because the fourth amendment
violation occurs at the time of the unlawful search and seizure, excluding the evidence in
court can only serve as a partial remedy. This may not be the case in the fifth amend-
ment context because the fifth amendment proscribes an individual from being "com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fifth amendment violation occurs at the time it is used in court and, therefore, excluding
such evidence can prevent the constitutional violation altogether. See infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
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The Court in Calandra also declared that the rule was a
"judicial remedy" that should be "restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served. ' 92 Therefore, the rule is usually implicated only in situa-
tions where it serves such a deterrent effect.9 3
2. As Applied to the Fifth Amendment
Unlike the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. 4 In
92. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
93. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 453 (illegally seized evidence was admissible
in the prosecution's case in chief since excluding it would serve no deterrent purpose).
See also Kamisar, supra note 87, at 597-606; Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Histor-
ical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than "An Empty
Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); Mathias, The Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 28
LOYOLA L. REV. 1 (1982); Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the
Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 935-36 (1979); Pitler, "The Fruits of the Poisonous
Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579, 581-89 (1968).
At what point the exclusionary rule is implicated is determined by a cost-benefit
analysis. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. The cost-benefit analysis is a balancing test
which weighs the costs of applying the exclusionary rule against the benefits of sup-
pressing the illegally obtained evidence. Some of the costs of imposing the exclusionary
rule which have been cited by the Court include: impeding the accusatorial and investi-
gative functions of a grand jury or trier of fact, wasting time on what may prove to be a
tangential issue, converting the grand jury into a preliminary trial on the merits, and
societal disrespect due to indiscriminate application of the rule. Id. at 349-50.
The benefits cited for imposing the exclusionary rule are not nearly as numerous as
the costs. In fact, the Court said that the exclusionary rule is a device used to effectuate
the fourth amendment and the Court does not have to adopt every method that may
deter impermissible police conduct. Id. at 348.
Recently in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), the Court applied this
balancing test and concluded that there is a good faith exception to the warrant require-
ment; the Court concluded that illegally seized evidence was admissible since the police
acted in good faith when they relied on an invalid warrant. Id. at 3416. Now the Court is
not only predicating exclusion on police misconduct, it is also saying that the benefit of
deterrence must outweigh the cost of exclusion. See Note, Nix v. Williams: Conjecture
Enters the Exclusionary Rule, 5 PACE L. REV. 657, 659-61 (1985) (discussing the origin
and justifications for the exclusionary rule).
94. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975). See Henkin, The Supreme Court,
1967 Term - Forward: On Drawing Lines, 82 HAfv. L. REv. 63, 222 (1968).
Under the fourth amendment, the essence of the constitutional wrong lies in
the initial invasion of person or property; the exclusionary rule, as originally con-
ceived, was a means of deterring this invasion. It is for this reason that the attenu-
ation limitation arose in the fourth amendment context. As the causal chain be-
tween a wrongful act by the police and subsequent evidence becomes more
attenuated, it becomes less likely that an intent to secure the evidence motivated
the police action or that its exclusion would deter similar action in the future.
17
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Miranda, this doctrine was strictly imposed when statements
were taken in the absence of the prescribed warnings or their
functional equivalent.95 Just as the original fourth amendment
exclusionary rule was based on numerous rationales before Ca-
landra transformed it into a deterrent-based rule,9 the Miranda
exclusionary rule also rested on a variety of principles which jus-
tified exclusion: to counter inherent compulsion,97 to protect the
defendant's human dignity,98 to ensure that the defendant's
statements are the product of free choice,9 9 to preserve the accu-
satorial system,100 to protect the individual's right of privacy, '01
On the other hand, the gravamen of a constitutional wrong under the fifth
amendment is the use of a defendant's coerced testimony against him in a crimi-
nal proceeding, not the mere act of compelling him to speak; the fifth amendment
exclusionary rule is an essential element of the constitutional right, not just a
means of enforcing the right.
Id.
95. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("[Tlhe prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination."). See also id. at 479 ("But unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.").
96. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-56 ("[Tlhe very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.").
98. Id. at 457 ("This [interrogation] atmosphere carries its own badge of intimida-
tion. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human
dignity."). See also L. Levy, supra note 23, at 432 ("While deeply committed to perpetu-
ating a system that minimized the possibilities of convicting the innocent, [the Framers]
were not less concerned about the humanity that the fundamental law should show even
to the offender.").
99. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 ("Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from
the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.") See also Friendly, supra note
23, at 723 (The "great purpose [of the self-incrimination clause is the] protection of the
lone individual against the all-powerful state.").
100. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 ("[Olur accusatory system of criminal justice de-
mands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compel-
ling it from his own mouth.") See also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976)
("[Tihe fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment - the preservation of an adver-
sary system of criminal justice.").
101. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shoft, 382 U.S. 406, 416 ("That privilege...
stands as a protection of ... the right of each individual to be let alone."); Berger, The
Unprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 213
(1978) ("human dignity" and "individual privacy" should be equally protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination).
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and to ensure the reliability of evidence."0 2 Moreover, the Mi-
randa exclusionary rule was aimed at the notion of police mis-
conduct.103 The Miranda Court did not say that the primary
function of exclusion was to deter police misconduct,'" 4 but the
Court concluded that deterrence would be the natural result of
applying the procedural safeguards.' 0 5
Just as the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was trans-
formed into a deterrent-based rule,106 the Miranda exclusionary
rule underwent a similar transformation. In Harris v. New
York,' 0 7 the Court held that a statement taken in the absence of
full Miranda warnings is admissible for impeachment purposes
because the deterrent effect of excluding the statement was
"speculative."108 The Court recognized "deterrence" as the only
principle underlying the fifth amendment exclusionary rule.10 9
Moreover, the Court imposed a balancing test and determined
that the cost of admitting unlawfully obtained statements did
102. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) ("The privilege against self-incrimination
is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admis-
sions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear
or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth."); Sunderland, Self-Incrimination
and Constitutional Principle: Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
171, 187 ("Various forms of coercion may force an individual to admit practically any-
thing" and this would result in "testimonially untrustworthy" evidence.).
103. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58, where the Court describes current police
practices and the need to employ safeguards to protect the individuals who are subjected
to the compulsion which is inherent in the interrogation environment. See also supra
notes 95-99.
104. See George, The Fruits of Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 478, 489 (1967) (Miranda's "theoretical basis" is to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination, but "the Court's social objective is control of the police.");
Comment, Exclusion of Confessions Obtained Without Miranda Warnings in Civil Tax
Fraud Proceedings, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1288, 1307 (1973) ("Deterrence [of abusive police
interrogations] was essential, in Miranda's view, to preserve fifth amendment
protection.").
105. See Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule, 35
HASTINGS L. J. 429, 449 (1984) ("The Court reviewed police interrogation manuals and
other sources documenting police interrogation practices, and concluded that warnings
were necessary to deter widespread police misconduct ...."); Berger, supra note 101, at
201 ("[Tjhe self-incrimination privilege [culminating in Miranda] . . . focuses upon a
broader interest in protecting the accused's constitutional privilege rather than solely
controlling state abuses.").
106. See supra note 91.
107. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See supra note 54.
108. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
109. Id. at 224-25.
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not outweigh the benefit of discrediting the defendant's perjuri-
ous testimony. 10
What the Harris Court successfully created by developing
this balancing analysis is an exclusionary rule which is triggered
when the cost of deterring police misconduct is so great that it
outweighs any benefit that could be derived from the use of the
unlawfully obtained testimony for impeachment purposes."'
3. The Tainted Fruit Doctrine
When unlawfully obtained evidence leads to secondary evi-
dence, the secondary evidence is known as derivative evi-
dence." '2 The derivative evidence doctrine, also known as the
"tainted fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, requires that all
secondary evidence obtained through the exploitation of a con-
stitutional violation be deemed inadmissible."'
110. Id. at 225. The Court believed that the benefit in discrediting the defendant's
perjurious testimony was of "valuable aid to the jury" especially since the possibility
that exclusion would deter police misconduct was "speculative" and, moreover, any de-
terrent effect the exclusionary rule may have is served "when the evidence in question is
made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief." Id. See supra note 93.
111. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 88, at 91-92 n.52 ("Harris proceeded
on the assumption that the weights on both pans of the cost-benefit scale are different
when the prosecution seeks to introduce statements obtained through a Miranda viola-
tion to impeach a testifying defendant.").
The Harris Court's use of evidence where its exclusion would serve no deterrent
purpose, appears to be in direct contradiction to Miranda's declaration that "the prose-
cution may not use statements . . .unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safe-
guards effective to secure the privileges against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444. Miranda does not qualify the prosecution's "use" of the evidence as use in its case
in chief. Nevertheless, where the exclusionary rule should have been triggered automati-
cally from the violation of Miranda, it is now triggered when the Court's deterrent-effect
theory justifies exclusion. See Keefe, Confessions, Admissions and the Recent Curtail-
ment of the Fifth Amendment Protection, 51 CONN. B. J. 266, 274 (1977) ("Harris ap-
pears to repudiate the philosophical approach adopted by the Warren Court that a per
se violation of a constitutional principle must be automatically punished by the invoca-
tion of the exclusionary sanction.").
112. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). Derivative
evidence: "[e]vidence which is derived or spawned from other illegally obtained evidence
is inadmissible because of the primary taint." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 399 (5th ed.
1979). See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 385, 389 (1972) ("The fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine has been regarded as a rule prohibiting the government from using in any man-
ner prejudicial to the accused information derived from facts learned as a result of the
unlawful acts of its agent.").
113. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. (Evidence is only "fruit of the poisonous tree" if it
"has been come at by exploitation of that illegality" rather than "by means sufficiently
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a. When is "Fruit" Tainted?
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not only ex-
tend to derivative physical evidence; the rule also extends to
confessions.11 4 Accordingly, a confession may be excluded as
tainted fruit of an earlier illegality even if the confession itself
complies with the precepts of Miranda."1 5
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.") (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF
GUILT 221 (1959)). In the context of the fourth amendment, the derivative evidence rule
began with Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). This is the
case which marks the inception of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See John-
son, The Return of the "Christian Burial Speech" Case, 32 EMORY L. J. 351, 363 n.56
(1983). In Silverthorne Lumber, corporate offices were unlawfully searched and records
were unlawfully seized. Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 390-91. The company made a
motion for the records to be returned since the search and corresponding seizure were
wholly unauthorized. Id. The motion was granted, but shortly thereafter a grand jury
issued a subpoena duces tecum for production of the same records which had been ille-
gally seized. Id. at 391.
In holding that the company need not comply with the subpoena, the Court declared
that: "[tihe essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all." Id. at 392. In stating that any evidence which could be traced to
the initial illegality is inadmissible, the Court first found a substantial relationship be-
tween the issuance of the subpoena and the fourth amendment violation. Id. Thus, the
Court extended the reach of the exclusionary rule so that it applies to both the original
evidence which was illegally obtained and the new evidence that may be derived from
the original evidence. Id. The Court did, however, note that derivative evidence does not
become "sacred and inaccessible" since it may be discovered through an "independent
source." Id. Discussion of the "independent source" doctrine is beyond the scope of this
article but for an analysis of its development and relation to the "inevitable discovery"
rule, see generally Note, Nix v. Williams: Conjecture Enters the Exclusionary Rule, 5
PACE L. REv. 657 (1985).
Silverthorne Lumber was reaffirmed in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338
(1939). Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated that "[to forbid the direct use
of methods [for acquiring evidence] but to put no curb on their full indirect use would
only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive
of personal liberty.'" Id. at 340. This statement foreshadowed the deterrent principle
that would inevitably be the justification of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
114. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. See infra note 115.
115. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); see also Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). In Fahy, the defendant
made a confession following an unlawful search and seizure of his car. As a result of the
confession, the defendant was convicted for wilfully injuring a public building in viola-
tion of a Connecticut statute. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that
the confession was inadmissible as a fruit of the unlawful search and seizure, and that
the defendant should be given the opportunity "to show that his admissions were in-
duced by being confronted with the illegally seized evidence." Id. at 91.
Brown and Wong Sun explain the development of the derivative evidence rule and
how that rule conformed to the deterrence theory. In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents
21
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In Brown v. Illinois,"6 the Court held that in assessing
whether a confession is the product of exploitation of an earlier
illegality, the following should be considered: 1) the temporal
proximity between the illegality and the confession; 2) the pres-
ence of intervening factors; 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the
misconduct; and 4) whether Miranda warnings were given."'
The voluntariness of the statement is a threshhold prerequisite
to determining exploitation by one of these four factors, because
an involuntary statement would not be an exploitation but a vio-
lation in itself.118 Moreover, the prosecution has the burden of
proving admissibility.1 1 9
forced their way into the home of James Wah Toy. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 473-74. In
response to an accusation that Toy had been selling narcotics, Toy told the agents that
he had not sold any drugs, but that one Johnny Yee had been selling heroin. Id. at 474.
The agents went immediately to Yee's house where they briefly interrogated him. Yee
surrendered approximately one ounce of heroin and told the police he had bought it a
few days earlier from Toy and Wong Sun. Id. The agents then went to a multifamily
dwelling, described by Toy, and arrested Wong Sun. Id. Both Toy and Wong Sun were
arraigned and then released on their own recognizance. Id, A few days later, both men
made incriminating statements. Id. at 476.
The Court found that Toy's arrest was illegal because it lacked probable cause;
moreover, the Court held that Toy's declarations were inadmissible because they were
the fruits of the illegal arrest. Id. at 485-88. In arriving at this decision, the Court noted
that a confession is no less a "fruit of the poisonous tree" than the material evidence
that has traditionally been derived from an unlawful search or seizure. The Court saw no
reason to omit application of the exclusionary rule merely because a distinction can be
drawn between verbal fruits and more tangible fruits. Id. at 485-86. "The policies under-
lying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical distinction between physical and
verbal evidence . . . . [T]he danger of relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of ver-
bal evidence would seem too great to warrant introducing such a distinction." Id. at 486.
Following this conclusion, the Wong Sun Court excluded the narcotics taken from
Yee because they were the tainted fruit of Toy's inadmissible declaration. The Court
then laid down the formula for determining when certain evidence is tainted fruit since
all evidence is not "fruit of the poisonous tree" merely because it would not have been
discovered except for the government's unlawful conduct. Id. at 487. Derivative evidence
is to be considered tainted fruit when it "has been come at by exploitation of [an official]
illegality" rather than "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint." Id. at 488 (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE op GUILT 221 (1959)). Unfortunately,
the Court gives very little direction for applying this exploitation formula. In fact, the
Court describes the surrounding circumstances and then concludes that "it is unreasona-
ble to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful invasion." Id. at 486.
116. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
117. Id. at 603-04.
118. Id. at 604.
119. Id.
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In Brown, two detectives made a warrantless entry into the
defendant's apartment while he was out.2 ' The entry was fol-
lowed by an equally unlawful search and when the defendant
arrived home he was arrested at gunpoint. 2 ' The detectives took
the defendant to an interrogation room at the police station,
gave him his Miranda warnings, and obtained a confession less
than two hours after his arrest. 2
At the trial, the state attempted to show that giving the de-
fendant his Miranda warnings was sufficient to attenuate the
taint of the unlawful arrest from the subsequent confession.'23
The Court said that accepting the state's argument would
weaken the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule and would in-
vite, rather than deter, police misconduct. 24 A police officer
could undertake any course of misconduct with impunity if
merely administering the Miranda warnings would cure previous
constitutional violations. 2 5
The Court concluded that the question of attenuation must
be made on a case-by-case basis and that the absence or delay in
administering Miranda warnings is only one of the factors to be
considered. 26 The Court held that the causal chain between the
illegal arrest and the subsequent confession had not been suffi-
ciently attenuated and, therefore, the defendant's confession was
not "an act of free will to purge the primary taint.'' 27 The Court
reached this conclusion because there were no significant inter-
vening factors - less than two hours had elapsed between the
illegal arrest and the confession, and the manner of the arrest
was flagrantly improper. 128
120. Id. at 593.
121. Id. at 592.
122. Id. at 592-95.
123. Id. at 602.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 602-03. To explain the danger of this proposition, the Brown Court
stated:
Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or "in-
vestigation," would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived there-
from could well be made. admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving
Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be
eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a "cure-all" .....
126. Id. at 603. See supra text accompanying note 133.
127. Id. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486).
128. Id. at 604-05.
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In United States v. Ceccolini,29 the Court held that there
had been sufficient attenuation between the illegal search and
the challenged testimony.130 In Ceccolini, a police officer was en-
gaged in conversation with his friend Hennessey, an employee of
a flower shop.1 31 The officer casually picked up an envelope
stuffed with money and policy slips that was sitting by the cash
register.132 Without revealing what he had found, he asked Hen-
nessey who the owner of the envelope was. Hennessey told the
officer that it belonged to the defendant. 3 3 The Court subse-
quently held that the search of the envelope was illegal. None-
theless, Hennessey's testimony was admissible because there was
a substantial lapse of time - many months - between the il-
legal search and the actual testimony. Furthermore, the Court
found that the actual testimony and the officer's conduct were
not flagrant or willful.134 In addition, the Court held that sup-
pression of Hennessey's testimony would not serve the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule. 3 5 A cost-benefit analysis was
then applied to the situation and the Court concluded that the
cost of permanently silencing Hennessey's testimony far out-
weighed any benefit that would be derived from exclusion.13'
b. The "Cat Out of the Bag" Rationale
The "cat out of the bag" rationale emerged in the context of
consecutive confessions.1 37 It was recognized that an initial con-
fession creates a psychological impact on the defendant that
cannot be separated from a later statement. 38 In such a situa-
tion, the "later confession may always be looked upon as a fruit
of the first. '139
129. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
130. Id. at 279-80. For the factors to be considered in an attenuation analysis, see
supra text accompanying note 117.
131. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 269-70 (1978).
132. Id. at 270.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 279-80.
135. Id. at 280.
136. Id.
137. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
138. Id. at 540-41.
139. Id. at 540. The Court held that:
After an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter
[Vol. 6:495
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In United States v. Bayer 40 the Supreme Court enunciated
the "cat out of the bag" rationale. In Bayer, the defendant, an
army officer, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the govern-
ment.' 4' The defendant's first statement was inadmissible as a
result of improper detention and coercive pressure.' 42 When the
defendant made a second confession six months later, the only
coercive pressure on the defendant was that he could not leave
the military base to which he was assigned without securing per-
mission.' 43 The court of appeals, in reversing the conviction,
held that the second confession was "patently the fruit of the
earlier one.'"4 The court of appeals based its holding on the
reasoning of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States14 and
Nardone v. United States.'46 In Silverthorne Lumber the Court
held that illegally obtained evidence shall not be used for any
purpose:147 any evidence that can be traced to the initial illegal-
ity is also inadmissible. Therefore, the exclusionary rule applies
to both the original evidence that was illegally obtained as well
as the secondary evidence derived from the original evidence." 8
The Nardone Court reaffirmed Silverthorne Lumber's ban of
both the direct and indirect use of illegally obtained evidence.'
49
However, both of these cases dealt with derivative physical evi-
dence rather than confessions,150 and thus, the Bayer Court
stated that because these cases did not deal with confessions
they were not controlling.' 5
The Supreme Court in Bayer, while reversing the court of
what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical
disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The
secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked
upon as the fruit of the first.
140. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
141. Id. at 533.
142. Id. at 539-40.
143. Id. at 540.
144. United States v. Bayer, 156 F.2d 964, 968-69 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd, 331 U.S. 532
(1947).
145. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
146. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
147. Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.
148. Id.
149. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939).
150. See supra note 113.
151. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 541.
1986]
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
appeals, maintained its focus on the effect of the coercive cir-
cumstances that rendered the first statement inadmissible so
that it could determine if the coercion had carried over to invali-
date the subsequent confession. 52 The Court found that the co-
ercion had not carried over because the coercive circumstances
which led the defendant to confess the first time had been re-
moved.153 The Court recognized that if the unlawful circum-
stances have been fully removed, an initial statement which lets
the "cat out of the bag" does not, in and of itself, render a later
statement inadmissible. 5 4 The Court made it clear that the ef-
fect of the fact that the "cat" is "out of the bag" cannot be ne-
gated; however, the taint created by having once confessed can
be dissipated. 5
III. The Decision: Oregon v. Elstad
A. Facts
On the afternoon of December 17, 1981, Officers Burke and
McAllister arrived at the home of Michael Elstad with an arrest
warrant charging Elstad with the burglary of a neighbor's
house. 156 Elstad's mother admitted the officers and showed them
to the bedroom where Elstad, wearing only a pair of shorts, was
listening to his stereo. 5 " At the officers' request, he dressed and
accompanied them into the living room.158 Officer McAllister
asked Mrs. Elstad to step into the kitchen where he informed
her that they had a warrant for her son's arrest. 59
Officer Burke, sitting with Elstad in the living room, asked
Elstad if he knew why the officers were there. 160 Elstad said he
did not. Burke then asked if he knew a person by the name of
Gross. Elstad said he did, and added that he had heard there
was a robbery at the Gross house. The officer then stated that he
believed Elstad was there. Elstad responded, "Yes, I was
152. Id. at 540.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 540-41.
155. Id. at 540.
156. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1289 (1985).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
[Vol. 6:495
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/5
OREGON v. ELSTAD
there."16
Elstad was brought to Officer McAllister's office at the po-
lice station. 62 Officers Burke and McAllister joined him approxi-
mately one hour later. 16s Elstad was then read his Miranda
rights for the first time. He was then asked if he understood his
rights. He answered affirmatively and added that he wanted to
speak. He signed a constitutional right waiver card, gave a full
statement which was read back to him for corrections, and then
he signed a typed version of the confession.6 4 The statement
implicated Elstad in the robbery. Elstad admitted that he
showed several acquaintances around the Gross premises and
gave them information about the premises. Elstad also revealed
that he was paid for this information and revealed the names of
the individuals who paid him. 65
Elstad, Burke, and McAllister were the only persons present
at the time Elstad made his confession; however, Elstad con-
ceded that he was not subjected to threats or compulsion and
Elstad stated that the officers made no promises during the
interrogation.166
B. The Decision
1. The Lower Courts
Elstad waived his right to a jury trial and made a timely
motion to suppress evidence of his statements to the police.167
The motion was denied and he was tried and convicted in the
Circuit Court for Polk County, Oregon.' 68 The court did not ad-
mit the statements Elstad made prior to being given Miranda
warnings, but it did allow the written confession in evidence,
holding that the confession was given freely, voluntarily, and
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. 673, 675, 658 P.2d 552, 553, petition denied, 295
Or. 617, 670 P.2d 1033 (1983), rev'd, Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). Before
returning to the police station, the officers responded to a possible crime and a third
officer who met them at the scene transported Elstad to the police station.
164. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1289.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 675, 658 P.2d at 553.
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knowingly." 9
Following his conviction of burglary in the first degree, El-
stad appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals which reversed
the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial. 70 The
court of appeals found that when Elstad made the statement, "I
was there,' 1 7' he made the statement while in custody without
the benefit of Miranda warnings; therefore, it was an unconstitu-
tionally obtained statement. 7 2 The court added that to make
the subsequent confession admissible, the coercive impact of the
first admission must have been dissipated so that the defendant
did not feel that he had let the "cat out of the bag.' 73 The fact
that there was no actual compulsion was irrelevant. 174
The state then petitioned for reconsideration or review. The
Oregon Court of Appeals denied reconsideration, and the Oregon
Supreme Court denied review.'" s The state applied to the Su-
preme Court of the United States for certiorari, and the Court
granted the state's application. 70
2. The Supreme Court Opinions
a. The Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in a six-to-three de-
cision, 77 held that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination does not require the suppression of a confession
made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of
rights, where the suspect had made an earlier voluntary admis-
sion in response to an officer's unwarned questions.77 The ma-
jority opinion focused on the fact that there was no "actual" co-
ercion compelling Elstad to make his initial confession. 179
169. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1290.
170. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 678, 658 P.2d at 555.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 677, 658 P.2d at 554.
175. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1290.
176. Oregon v. Elstad, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).
177. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and White
joined Justice O'Connor in the Court's opinion.
178. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
179. Id.
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The Court stated that under Miranda a suspect who is sub-
jected to custodial interrogation must be apprised of his consti-
tutional rights prior to questioning so that his privilege against
self-incrimination is adequately safeguarded.1 80 If the requisite
procedural safeguards or their equivalent are not administered,
then there is an irrebuttable presumption of compulsion and,
therefore, the suspect's unwarned response is inadmissible.18
The Court applied this reasoning so that Elstad's initial un-
warned statement, "I was there," was held inadmissible. 82 How-
ever, the analysis applied to Elstad's second confession was
different.'83
The Court described how the Miranda exclusionary rule
should be applied to an initial statement. The rule can be trig-
gered by a violation that does not reach constitutional magni-
tude. 8 4 Justice O'Connor explained that the Miranda exclusion-
ary rule has a wider effect than the fifth amendment itself: the
fifth amendment only forbids the use of compelled testimony in
the prosecution's case in chief; Miranda, on the other hand, held
that any statement taken in the absence of the prescribed warn-
ings is presumptively compelled 8 5 The exclusionary rule, there-
fore, may be used when there has merely been an infringement
of Miranda.'
After making its distinction between the fifth amendment
exclusionary rule and the Miranda exclusionary rule, the Court
adopted the Tucker-Quarles rationale 7 that the Miranda warn-
ings are only prophylactic measures to protect the privilege
against self-incrimination; they are not constitutional rights in
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1290 ("The State conceded that Elstad had been in custody when he
made his statement, 'I was there,' and accordingly agreed that this statement was inad-
missible as having been given without the prescribed Miranda warning.").
182. Id. at 1298.
183. Id. ("[T]here is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect's
initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Miranda, was voluntary.
The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily
made.").
184. Id. at 1292.
185. Id.
186. Id. ("Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.").
187. See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
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and of themselves. 188 Relying on this theoretical foundation, the
Court noted that where a non-coerced statement taken in viola-
tion of Miranda is followed by a statement taken in compliance
with Miranda, there has been no constitutional violation. 89
Only Miranda has been violated. Therefore, the fruits doctrine
does not apply because this doctrine only applies where there
has been a constitutional violation. 90
The Court then borrowed the Tucker principle that the ex-
clusionary rule has a dual purpose - to deter impermissible
police conduct and to ensure the trustworthiness of evidence. 19'
When this dual purpose is not served by exclusion, the evidence
should not be suppressed. 9 2 While the alleged "fruit" dealt with
in Tucker was the testimony of a witness whose identity was re-
vealed in the defendant's unwarned statement, Justice O'Connor
stated that the term "fruit" also encompasses a defendant's own
incriminating testimony.9 3 The Court then concluded that the
"absence of any coercion or improper tactics undercuts the twin
rationales" of the exclusionary rule.194 In other words, when
there has been no actual coercion, there is no problem with de-
terring police misconduct or assuring the trustworthiness of evi-
dence. Therefore, a confession like Elstad's second statement
need not be suppressed, even though it followed on the heels of
an unwarned statement, because the unwarned statement in-
volved no actual compulsion.'9 5
188. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292-93.
189. Id. The Court noted that, "absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in
obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned ad-
mission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." Id. at 1296. The Court also
stated that, "[i]f errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the pro-
phylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable conse-
quences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself." Id. at 1293.
190. Id. at 1293 (The Court made a parallel to Tucker and stated, "[slince there was
no actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights, the case was not controlled
by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation must be
suppressed.").
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The court stated that:
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to admin-
ister the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances
calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will so taints the
[Vol. 6:495
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss3/5
OREGON v. ELSTAD
Justice O'Connor noted that any compulsion arising from an
answer to the initial unwarned questions is distinct from the co-
ercive nature of the unwarned questions themselves. 196 The Jus-
tice contended that the court of appeals' focus on the compul-
sion created by the defendant's own answer was misplaced. 197
The Court stated that the coercive impact of the answer was not
Miranda's concern. The statements must have been obtained
from the defendant through actually or presumptively coercive
methods to be inadmissible. 198 Indeed, the Court acknowledged
that even a voluntary disclosure may have a coercive effect, but
such "voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret [does not qualify] as
state compulsion.' 199
The Court then bolstered its premise that the proper focus
is on the official questioning by reaffirming the "cat out of the
bag" rationale that was enunciated in United States v. Bayer.20 0
The Court interpreted this rationale to mean that once the de-
fendant lets the "cat out of the bag" the coercive effect that
such disclosure has on a later confession can be dissipated with
time.20' The Court reasoned that this interpretation would pre-
vent a suspect from indefinitely immunizing himself from the
consequences of a subsequent waiver by merely responding to
pre-warned questions.2 2 In addition, the Court remarked that in
Elstad's case the ultimate effect of any psychological disadvan-
tage created by a defendant's own statement is "speculative and
attenuated at best. '20 3 Because there are numerous factors
which motivate defendants to confess, the Court refused to sup-
press an uncoerced statement on a theory as weak as the "cat
out of the bag.' '20 4
The last issue facing the Court was the validity of Elstad's
investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffec-
tive for some indeterminate period.
Id.
196. Id. at 1294.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1295.
200. Id. at 1294-95.
201. Id. at 1295.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1295-96.
204. Id. at 1296.
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waiver of his rights. Elstad argued that he was unaware that his
initial confession could not be used against him.0 5 He claimed
that this lack of knowledge rendered him incapable of giving a
fully informed waiver. The Court rejected this argument, stating
that the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver is not jeopardized
by the fact that he does not have a "full and complete apprecia-
tion of all of the consequences flowing from the nature and the
quality of the evidence in the case.""0 "
The Court briefly addressed the officers' failure to adminis-
ter the Miranda warnings at the time Elstad was first taken into
custody. 207 The Court stated that the police officer may not have
given the warnings because either he was confused as to whether
his short discussion with Elstad constituted "custodial interroga-
tion" or because he did not want to alarm Elstad's mother.20 8
The Court then concluded that "[w]hatever the reason for [his]
oversight, the incident had none of the earmarks of coercion. "209
The Court remanded the case for an inquiry into the cir-
cumstances of the custodial interrogation and the actions of the
police to determine whether Elstad's post-Miranda statement
was voluntary.10
b. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined,
presents a strong stance in opposition to the majority. First, Jus-
tice Brennan declared that the Court rejected the "cat out of the
bag" rationale when it reasoned that there is a "speculative"
causal connection between a statement taken in violation of Mi-
randa and the defendant's subsequent decision to make a post-
warning admission.2 1' Brennan stated that the "common-sense
approach" 12 would be to consider the subsequent confession as
having been presumptively tainted by the initial confession if
205. Id. at 1297.
206. Id. at 1298.
207. Id. at 1297.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1298.
211. Id. at 1300.
212. Id. at 1301.
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the initial confession had been taken in violation of Miranda.2 13
He stated that this approach has been accepted by the majority
of state courts.14
Justice Brennan noted the difficulty that the public might
have in trying to understand the Court's pronouncement that a
statement taken in violation of Miranda can be both totally vol-
untary and irrebuttably presumed to have been coerced.215 In-
sisting that the untainted confession presumptively taints the
post-Miranda confession, Justice Brennan also acknowledged
that the presumption could be rebutted. 16 He stated that if the
prosecutor could show that the taint of the first confession was
so attenuated that the later confession was not produced by the
existence of the first, then the later confession would be admissi-
ble.2 1 7 Justice Brennan then restated the four factors set forth in
Brown v. Illinois to determine whether the illegal confession
tainted the challenged confession: "the strength of the causal
connection between the illegal action and the challenged evi-
dence, their proximity in time and place, the presence of inter-
vening factors, and the 'purpose and flagrancy of the official mis-
conduct.' "218 Justice Brennan reasoned that the Court replaced
this four-part inquiry with the rationale that when Miranda
warnings follow an illegal confession, attenuation can result from
an individual's exercise of his free will in choosing to confess for
a second time.219 The focus of Justice Brennan's dissent was the
Court's use of this abstract notion of free will and the premise
that Miranda warnings alone are a sufficient intervening factor
to purge the taint of the pre-warned statement.2
Justice Brennan applauded the Court's declaration that a
statement taken in the absence of Miranda warnings is pre-
sumptively coerced for fifth amendment purposes. 221 The Justice
stated that this reaffirmation of Miranda will repair what he
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1300.
215. Id. at 1316.
216. Id. at 1300.
217. Id. at 1307.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1307-08.
220. Id. at 1307-13.
221. Id. at 1314.
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perceives as the damage that has resulted from the recent opin-
ions of Tucker and Quarles. He stated that these cases set forth
"inaccurate assertions 221 2 concerning Miranda. Nonetheless, the
Justice disagreed with the Court's treatment of evidence that
has been proximately derived from such an illegal confession.223
In fact, Justice Brennan stated that "Itihe Court simply has not
confronted the basic premise of the derivative-evidence rule
. ... 224 To give Miranda its full meaning, the Justice said the
derivative evidence rule should be used to exclude evidence that
was discovered as a direct result of the first illegally obtained
confession. 25 This exclusion will, in Justice Brennan's view, pro-
vide the meaningful deterrence that is the purpose of the fifth
amendment exclusionary rule. He did not agree with the Court
that excluding only the initial unwarned statement will provide
sufficient deterrence of police misconduct.226
Justice Brennan concluded his dissent by describing the
Court's analysis of the police officers' failure to administer Mi-
randa warnings to Elstad. He declared that "[riather than
acknowledg[ing] that the police in this case clearly broke the
law, the Court bends over backwards to suggest why the officers
may have been justified in failing to obey Miranda.'227 As he
dealt with each of the Court's justifications for the Elstad opin-
ion, Justice Brennan clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with
the Court's application of the principles enunciated in Miranda.
c. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that he believed the
Court intended a narrow holding to be applied only where the
unwarned, illegal confession though presumptively coercive
under Miranda, is voluntary, and where the second confession is
not a product of the first.2 28 However, Justice Stevens had two
basic contentions with respect to the Court's holding. First, he
stated that the premises set forth by the Court will be difficult
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1314-15.
224. Id. at 1319.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1320.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1322.
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to define and to apply in future cases because of the Court's dis-
tinction between "actual coercion" and "irrebuttably presumed
coercion."229 Justice Stevens reasoned that the Miranda Court
ruled that a presumption of coercion arises whenever a suspect
is subjected to custodial interrogation, and the Court could not,
therefore, divide coercive aspects of the custodial environment
into varying degrees of coercion.230 Miranda specifically set up
an irrebuttable presumption to "avoid the kind of fact-bound
inquiry that [the Elstad] decision will surely engender. '2 3
The second contention concerns the Court's treatment of
whether or not there was a constitutional violation.2 3 2 Justice
Stevens stated that the Court should have acknowledged the
protection afforded an accused by the fifth amendment. Instead,
the use of such evidence directly taints the constitutional pro-
tection of the fifth amendment.2
3
IV. Analysis
Oregon v. Elstad is not an exception to Miranda. However,
the case does represent a curtailment of the reach of the Mi-
randa decision. The Court tried to reconcile Miranda's pre-
sumption of inherent compulsion with a confession that has all
of the trappings of voluntariness; in fact, it is a confession
marked only by one flaw: it was preceded by a statement taken
in violation of Miranda. The Court reconciled the conflicts be-
tween voluntary and presumptively coerced statements by rely-
ing on the distinction it had previously drawn between a viola-
tion of Miranda and a violation of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.2 4
The majority readily acknowledged that Elstad's initial
statement, taken in the absence of Miranda warnings, was not
admissible.2 35 The Court did not intend to dilute the immediate
goal of Miranda: the exclusion of statements taken in custodial
interrogation which deny a defendant's right against compulsory
229. Id. at 1324.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1325-26.
233. Id. at 1326.
234. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1292. See also supra notes 54 and 111.
235. Id. at 1298.
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self-incrimination.23 The fact that Miranda set up an irrebut-
table presumption of coercion was accepted.2 " But the Court
held that the Miranda presumption of coercion is not strong
enough to taint a subsequent confession that had been preceded
by proper warnings.238 This decision limits Miranda so that its
power of exclusion extends only to statements that are given in
response to unwarned questions.
Basing its rationale on Tucker239 and Quarles,2'" the major-
ity stated that Miranda warnings are not themselves constitu-
tional rights, and that the warnings have a broader sweep than
the fifth amendment privilege itself. 241 The Court's reasoning
that a confession must be involuntary before it violates the fifth
amendment does not recognize Miranda's concern for the inher-
ent coercion of custodial interrogation. However, this reasoning
and the Court's apparent dismissal of the concerns of Miranda
are an extension of the rationale developed in the Harris line of
cases.
24 2
In Harris, the presumptively coerced statement was ex-
cluded from the prosecution's case in chief; however, it was ad-
mitted into evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony.2 3 In
Elstad, the Court also did not allow the presumptively tainted
statement to be used in the prosecution's case in chief"44 but the
Court did allow a second confession to be used.245 The Court de-
236. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 478-79 (1966).
237. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292 ("[Tlhe Miranda presumption ... [is] irrebuttable
for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief ....").
238. Id. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("We have always rejected, until today,
the notion that 'individual will' alone presumptively serves to insulate a person's actions
from the taint of earlier official illegality.... Nor have we ever allowed Miranda warn-
ings alone to serve talismanically to purge the taint of prior illegalities." (emphasis in
orginal)).
239. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 434, 444 (1974) ("[Tlhese procedural safeguards
were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.").
240. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
241. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292..
242. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). See supra note 54.
1 243. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224 ("It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inad-
missible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes ..
244. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
245. Id.
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clared that as in Harris the use the prosecution wanted to make
of the defendant's statement fell outside the reach of Miranda
because Miranda was only concerned with excluding presump-
tively tainted statements from the prosecution's case in chief.246
The Harris Court explained that when a situation falls beyond
Miranda's reach, the due process voluntariness test must be ap-
plied to determine whether the statement is admissible.247
Relying on Harris, the Elstad Court promulgated a founda-
tion upon which it could limit Miranda's bright-line rule and
resurrect the due process voluntariness test. Yet, it could be ar-
gued that when the Miranda Court determined that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive, Miranda took the due pro-
cess voluntariness inquiry out of the hands of the courts. Mi-
randa's bright-line rule was the result of that Court's concern
that the potentiality for compulsion is always present in custo-
dial interrogation and it would be difficult, and sometimes im-
possible, to determine if such compulsion violated a suspect's
fifth amendment rights.2 8
By reinstating the due process inquiry, the Court also rein-
stated problems of judicial economy and inaccurate decisions.
Without the aid of a bright-line rule, determining whether there
has been compulsion is a time-consuming task.2 4 In addition,
the decisions that will set forth the factors which constitute
compulsion will be as varied as the pre-Miranda decisions which
strugglecto determine when police conduct reached the point of
compulsion.26
Without overruling Miranda, Elstad sets forth a pre-Mi-
randa method of dealing with derivative evidence. The Court
distinguished between the actual compulsion which violates the
fifth amendment and the presumption of compulsion which vio-
246. Id. at 1292-93.
247. Id. ("Where an unwarned statement is preserved for use in situations that fall
outside the sweep of the Miranda presumption, 'the primary criterion of admissibility
[remains] the "old" due process voluntariness test.' ") (quoting Schulhofer, Confession
and The Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 877 (1981)).
248. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
249. See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Leading Cases, 98 HARv. L. REV. 87,
146 (1984) ("Fifth amendment 'voluntariness' ... remains a metaphysically indetermi-
nate legal concept .... ").
250. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
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lates Miranda.2 5' Yet the Court leaves intact all of the safe-
guards which apply to the initial confession, thereby allowing
lower courts to decide whether admitting a second confession
would violate a constitutional right.2 52 The Court is concerned
with evidence that is one step removed from the constitutional
illegality. It looks at this derivative evidence in light of Mi-
randa's goals of achieving judicial economy and accurate, pre-
dictable decisions. The Court's holding reveals that it did not
believe that Miranda's goals were strong enough to silence per-
manently a confession that has been taken in full compliance
with the fifth amendment.
Nevertheless, stating that the second confession was taken
in full compliance with the fifth amendment creates an inconsis-
tency that overrules Miranda by implication. In his dissent, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that if the Miranda warnings are not part of
the fifth amendment privilege, then the Miranda Court had no
authority to impose the Miranda requirements on the states
through the fourteenth amendment.2 53 Yet, the Elstad Court si-
multaneously retains some aspects of Miranda while declaring
that the Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights.2 54
A. The Consequence of Not Finding a Constitutional
Violation
The Court does not apply the traditional fourth amendment
"tainted fruits" analysis to the facts of this case.2 55 The Court
stated that in order to suppress Elstad's second confession as
"fruits," it must have been found to be the result of a constitu-
tional violation.256 Because the Court found that the initial in-
terrogation only violated Miranda and not the fifth amend-
ment,257 it concluded that the fourth amendment "tainted fruit"
251. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298 ("ITIhere is no warrant for presuming coercive effect
where the suspect's initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation of Mi-
randa, was voluntary.").
252. Id.
253. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1325-26.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1293.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1292.
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precedents were not controlling.25 8 Moreover, the Court does not
try to draw an analogy between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments, which would allow the fourth amendment precedents to
provide guidelines for the fifth amendment situation. Instead,
the Court differentiates the fourth and fifth amendments by dis-
tinguishing fourth and fifth amendment violations.ou
The Court states that "a Fourth Amendment violation
'taints' the confession"2 60 that is derived from the unlawful
search or seizure. To find that such a "taint" has been dissi-
pated, there must have been a "sufficient break in events to un-
dermine the inference that the confession was caused by the
Fourth Amendment violation."2 61 The Court must apply the
four factors set forth in Brown to determine when this attenua-
tion occurs. 2  Therefore, determining whether the confession,
which is the fruit of a fourth amendment violation, has been
given in compliance with Miranda is only a "threshhold require-
ment. ' 263 Beyond this, the prosecution must show that the con-
fession has not been tainted by the unlawful search or seizure.2"
The Court's analysis of the fifth amendment situation is
quite different. By explaining that the purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule - deterrence of impermissible police conduct - is
not served by excluding a confession that involves no actual co-
ercion,65 the Court eliminated the need to apply Brown's four-
factor test to determine if there had been sufficient attenuation
between the initial illegality and the subsequent statement.
Then, relying on the premise that there has been no constitu-
tional violation, the Court declared that the giving of Miranda
warnings would effectively cure the error because the error was
procedural.26 6 Justice Brennan, in his dissent, described this as
an "automatically dissipated" taint267 and declared that the
258. Id. at 1293.
259. Id. at 1291-94.
260. Id. at 1292.
261. Id.
262. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). See supra notes 116-18 and ac-
companying text.
263. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
264. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
265. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293.
266. Id. at 1293-94.
267. Id. at 1299 (emphasis in original).
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Court has never "allowed Miranda warnings alone to serve talis-
manically to purge the taint of prior illegalities." 8 However,
Justice Brennan's argument is only applicable where there has
been an initial constitutional violation. When Brown v. Illinois
held that the giving of Miranda warnings is not, in itself, a suffi-
cient intervening factor to dissipate the taint,269 it was con-
cerned with the taint of a constitutional violation, not the
breach of a "prophylactic standard." Nonetheless, one can
clearly see the danger in the Court's distinction. If the police are
only deterred from violating constitutional rights instead of pro-
cedural safeguards, it is hard to envision how such safeguards
will adequately protect constitutional rights.
It is inconsistent to say that excluding the fruit of a fourth
amendment violation will deter police misconduct, yet excluding
the fruit of a Miranda violation will not. However, the Elstad
decision implies such a rule. Nevertheless, this new rule can be
justified by the fact that the Court is declining to create a new
breed of exclusionary rule. If the Court in Elstad had excluded
the second confession where there was no constitutional viola-
tion, it would have been applying the exclusionary rule to evi-
dence obtained from the violation of Miranda's judicially cre-
ated requirements. The exclusionary rule only prohibits the
prosecution from using evidence in the case in chief that has
been obtained through a governmental violation of the suspect's
constitutionally protected rights or through an exploitation of
such violationY.2 1 Without a constitutional violation the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court reinforces the theory
that the fifth amendment privilege is not implicated from the
taking of self-incriminating statements.2 71 Rather, it is when
such statements are used in a criminal trial that the privilege
can be invoked.2 7 2 In other words, the constitutional violation
does not occur when a compelled statement is taken from a de-
fendant, but when such statements are used to incriminate the
268. Id. at 1308.
269. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603.
270. See supra notes 83-111 and accompanying text. See also Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
271. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
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defendant. The Court upheld this rationale by excluding the
statement taken in response to pre-warned questioning. Because
the state never tried to admit this statement,7 ' Elstad's fifth
amendment privilege was never violated; in fact, his fifth
amendment privilege was not even presumptively violated. Con-
sequently, because the Court concludes that Elstad's constitu-
tional rights were not violated, the exclusionary rule cannot be
invoked to strike down his second confession.
Of course, if the Court had found that the failure to give
Miranda warnings does itself violate the fifth amendment, there
would be no problem in extending an exclusionary rule to the
derivative evidence of a Miranda violation. It is true that this
solution would exclude many statements that are truly voluntary
under due process standards. Moreover, as the Court pointed
out, Miranda already excludes many statements that are "other-
wise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. ' 7 '
The Elstad Court did recognize the merit in the Miranda pre-
sumption, but just how far should the Court go in excluding
statements that do not infringe on the defendant's constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination?
B. The Court Puts the Cat Back in the Bag
1. Finding a Causal Relationship Between the Illegality
and the Subsequent Confession
After concluding that a procedural Miranda violation does
not taint a subsequent voluntary and warned statement, 7 5 the
Court looked at the effect the first statement had on the second
statement.27 6 This is an entirely different analysis from the one
the Court conducted in determining whether a presumption of
coercion can actually taint a subsequent confession that was pre-
ceded by proper Miranda warnings. Here, the Court is con-
cerned with the psychological impact that the prior confession
had on the defendant's decision to make a second confession.277
Instead of looking at the prior questioning, the court focused on
273. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1290.
274. Id. at 1292.
275. Id. at 1293.
276. Id. at 1294-96.
277. Id. at 1298.
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the prior answer."'
The Court's application of the "cat out of the bag" analysis
is inconsistent with the previous application of that rationale.27 9
The majority's argument is based on the premise that the causal
relationship between the unwarned confession and the subse-
quent confession is "speculative" and "attenuated. '"2 80 Such a
declaration seems to contravene common sense and case law. For
example, the Court cites Bayer to support its contention that
there can be dissipation where consecutive confessions are con-
cerned. 81 However, to show such attenuation the Court relied
on the giving of Miranda warnings as the sole intervening factor
to dissipate the taint. In fact, there were no substantial dissipat-
ing factors: there was no significant change in the time between
confessions, and the change in locale to the police station only
made the atmosphere more coercive for the defendant. Thus, by
declaring that the causal relationship between the two confes-
sions was "speculative," the Court denied that there was a taint.
In so doing, the Court saved itself from the difficult task of
describing the factors which it claims led to the dissipation of
taint between Elstad's confessions.2 8
Nonetheless, if we view the Court's analysis in terms of the
end it was trying to reach - to prevent highly probative volun-
tary statements from being irretrievably lost - it appears that
the Court may not have been implying that an initial voluntary
confession has no effect on a subsequent statement, but that the
effect it does have does not warrant the suppression of both
statements. Because the initial confession breached a procedural
requirement without infringing on the constitutional privilege,
the Court reasoned that once the procedures are administered
any proclivity the defendant has toward confessing is based on
the same factors which might lead any suspect to confess:2 3 anx-
iety, remorse, hope for lenient treatment, lack of concern about
the consequences, etc. The Court's sole concern is that a defend-
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1947); United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277-78 (1978).
280. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1296.
281. Id. at 1294-95.
282. Id. at 1295-96.
283. Id. at 1296.
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ant's confession is not the result of a denial of his privilege
against self-incrimination.2 8
The Oregon Court of Appeals applied the "cat out of the
bag" analysis as if it were a literal metaphor, a type of but-for
test.28 That court suppressed the second confession solely on
the basis that Elstad had already confessed, so the "cat" was
"out of the bag."'286 But this determination frustrates the "cat
out of the bag" rationale as it was originally conceived.
In United States v. Bayer, the Supreme Court declared that
a causal nexus may exist between an induced initial confession
and a subsequent confession because of the psychological conse-
quence of having once confessed.2 7 Yet the Bayer Court said
that a presumed psychological disadvantage does not "perpetu-
ally [disable] the confessor from making a usable" confession.288
The Bayer Court posits this psychological impact so that the
second confession is considered a "tainted fruit" unless tradi-
tional principles of attenuation can be applied to dissipate the
taint. As previously noted, the flaw in the Elstad Court's reason-
ing was the declaration that the administration of Miranda
warnings can itself dissipate the taint of a statement previously
taken in the absence of such warnings.
In addition, the Elstad Court never refers to the second
confession as being a "fruit" of the first. Elstad cites Bayer
which set up the psychological nexus as a given. In Bayer the
Court noted that with consecutive confessions, "a later confes-
sion always may be looked upon as a fruit of the first."289 The
Elstad Court makes a single reference to the subsequent state-
ment as being an "alleged 'fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda viola-
tion."290 That is the only indication that the Court acknowl-
edged that the second statement could be a fruit. The Elstad
Court never considered the second statement to be a "fruit" of
the first. The Court believed that the statements were separate
and concluded that in determining the admissibility of the sec-
284. Id.
285. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 678, 658 P.2d at 555.
286. Id.
287. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.
288. Id. at 540-41.
289. Id. at 540.
290. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293 (emphasis added).
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ond confession the issue is whether it comports with due process
and Miranda.291
By analyzing the second statement as a separate confession
rather than a "fruit" of the first, the Court is able to argue that
any psychological effect the first confession had on the second
was not state compulsion.292 This conclusion reveals why the
Court was so careful in its delineation of what was a fruit. If
compulsion is created by the defendant's own actions, the fifth
amendment is not violated.
2. Dissipating the Effect of the Psychological Impact
The problem with the "cat out of the bag" analysis is the
fact that the psychological disadvantage of having once con-
fessed cannot be negated. 298 No matter how much time passes or
how the circumstances have changed, the cat can never be put
back in the bag. Because the Court chose not to create a per se
rule of inadmissibility in the context of consecutive confessions,
where the first confession has been only presumptively coerced,
it must look to circumstances which dissipate the prior illegal-
ity. Indeed, this is what the Elstad Court has done. It looked to
the prior illegality because it could not negate the psychological
effect.
The Court's interpretation of the "cat out of the bag" ra-
tionale required it to focus on the fact that the illegality in the
instant case created a mere presumption of compulsion.29' If the
Bayer Court had set forth a rule requiring that the Court focus
on the psychological effect, it would not matter whether the co-
ercion was deliberate on the part of the police or presumptively
present in the atmosphere surrounding the interrogation. In-
deed, the only pertinent fact would be that the defendant made
a previous confession which must have had a psychological im-
pact on the defendant so that it led him to make a second con-
fession. While this seems like a common-sense approach to a
consecutive confession situation, it was not the approach taken
291. Id. at 1298.
292. Id. at 1295.
293. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.
294. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1296.
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by the Bayer Court.29 Relying on Bayer, Elstad holds that the
psychological effect of having once confessed can be
dissipated.296
Because a Miranda violation does not, in and of itself, reach
constitutional dimensions, the prior illegality is only a presump-
tion.19 7 Consequently, it is easier to dissipate a presumed taint
rather than the taint of a flagrant constitutional violation. This
is what the Court concluded in Elstad when it determined that
an unwarned yet uncoerced statement cannot taint a subsequent
voluntary, warned statement.2 98
However, the Court's analysis leaves no room for consider-
ing the strength of the impact on the defendant who makes an
original confession which literally throws the "cat out of the
bag," as opposed to a situation where the defendant merely inti-
mates his involvement. The fact that a suspect may feel he has
sealed his fate to a greater degree than someone like Elstad, who
gave a bare first admission, is irrelevant to the Court. The Court
merely tells us that in this particular instance, "the causal con-
nection between any psychological disadvantage created by [El-
stad's] admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate is spec-
ulative and attenuated at best. ' 299 Because there was nothing
flagrant about the first confession the Court never reaches this
issue. Consequently, the Court gives no guidance for the applica-
tion of its holding.
C. More Problems with Custodial Interrogation
Another aspect of Elstad that compromises the decision's
ability to afford guidance to lower courts is the Court's attitude
toward the problems of custodial interrogation. This flaw in the
Court's reasoning is made quite apparent in Justice Brennan's
dissent.300
The Court goes out of its way to explain the police officers'
failure to administer the Miranda warnings before Elstad was
295. See supra notes 137-55.
296. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1295.
297. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
298. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298.
299. Id. at 1296.
300. Id. at 1320-21.
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initially interrogated. 30' Both the State and the officers them-
selves conceded that Elstad was in custody when they sat down
in the living room before the interrogation began.302 In such a
situation, the failure to give Elstad his Miranda warnings was a
disregard of one of the fundamental aspects of custodial
interrogation.
The majority's closing discussion of the Miranda decision
implies that Miranda set forth unrealistic goals. The Court
states that "a breach of Miranda procedures may not be identi-
fied as such until long after full Miranda warnings are adminis-
tered and a valid confession obtained. 3 3 The Court continues
by stating that determining when custodial interrogation begins
can be "murky" and "difficult" so that police officers have a
hard time deciding when to administer Miranda warnings.304
Following the Miranda decision the Court spent several
years defining custodial interrogation,0 5 and to say that Mi-
randa's most basic precept - giving warnings during custodial
interrogation - is virtually unworkable is to undercut Mi-
randa's strength in the few areas that it maintains applicability.
The Elstad Court unjustifiably and unnecessarily went too far in
its characterization of Miranda.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision to refuse to extend Mi-
randa's reach to consecutive, though voluntary, confessions is
neither surprising nor unjustified. While the Court in Elstad
does not guard the fifth amendment as the Miranda Court an-
ticipated, it also has not deprived Miranda of all of its meaning.
In Elstad, the Court retained Miranda's presumption: if a state-
ment is taken without procedural safeguards, it is presumed to
be coerced for purposes of admissibility in the prosecution's case
in chief. The Court then pushed Miranda aside and formulated
an analysis to apply to the fruits of a "voluntary" confession
taken in violation of the Miranda procedures. The initial state-
301. Id. at 1296-97.
302. Id. at 1297.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See supra note 27.
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ment is still considered presumptively coerced and, therefore,
inadmissible, but the statement which follows cannot be tainted
if there has been no constitutional violation to carry over into
the fruit. Thus, the second statement's admissibility must be de-
termined based on the voluntariness of that statement itself.
In carrying its distinction between actual and presumptive
coercion into the province of consecutive confessions, the Court
raises unanswered questions: is the Court actually altering care-
fully developed doctrines, or is the Court merely interpreting
Miranda as it has since Warren Burger became Chief Justice in
1969? The latter description is the fair interpretation of this
case. The Court is merely taking the dichotomy it created be-
tween actual and presumptive coercion and applying it to an
area that was not addressed by the Miranda Court. However,
Oregon v. Elstad is more than a recital of recent interpretations
of Miranda. By severing the umbilical cord that appeared to ex-
ist between a Miranda violation and a fifth amendment viola-
tion, the Court can easily displace Miranda's perpetual adher-
ence to the constitutional privilege. Therefore, Miranda stands
as a guard over statements taken in the absence of procedural
safeguards while the fifth amendment bars admission of any evi-
dence which would deprive a defendant of his privilege against
self-incrimination. Consequently, the constitutional privilege
moves forward to prevent the admission of all tainted evidence
and its tainted fruit, and Miranda lags behind to make sure all
admissible confessions have complied with its prescribed
warnings.
Hopefully, the formula enunciated by the Court will prove
to be a predictable, workable analysis that does not compromise
the immediate goal of the Miranda decision, but such a hope
seems fleeting. Serious doubts will surround the application of
the fifth amendment until the Court ceases to pay lip service to
the Miranda decision and either reaffirms it or overrules it.
Gail Matthews Kambic
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